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October 26, 1978 
President Jimmy Carter 
White House 
Washington, D. C. 
Re: DICKEY-LINCOLN WATER PROJECT 
Dear President Carter: 
First of all, I want you and the staff at the White House to know that I am deeply 
appreciative for the input, suggestions and counsel provided ma as Governor of 
Maine with respect to the Dickey-Lincoln and related type water projects. As a 
matter of fact, very early in my deliberations on this proposed project, which 
many feel could either be the best thing to happen to Maine or the worst thing to 
happen to Maine for present and future generations of Maine people, I was provided 
a copy of a handwritten memo by Governor Jimmy Carter dated October 1, 1973 as 
it relates to the Spewrell Bluff Dam, by some of our mutual friends who felt your 
and my approach in matters of consequence and government are similar; as is 
the problem you faced and I am now facing with respect to the Dickey-Lincoln Project. 
More than coincident ally, I have referred to and read your memo a number of times and 
now have it before me and there is also a simlarity to the extent of our mutual 
experiences. I say this because your very opening sentence in your memo states to 
wit: "My decision on whether Spewrell Bluff Dam should be built is one of the 
most difficult I have had to make with the exception of state government reorganization 
which has been the most tune-consuming.
fr
 With the exception of the fact that I have 
spent much more time on the unfortunate Indian Land Claim than state government 
reorganization, my experience has unfortunately been the same as your own experience 
as Governor of Georgia. 
I too "have personally read all the written reports and transcripts of oral testimony 
made available to me" as you indicated in your memo. I too have consulted with many 
people and delegations and I too have read and analyzed thousands of letters and 
telegrams and petitions and resolutions. I too have traversed the river and area by 
foot, by vehicle, canoe, as well as by helicopter. My family, too, has used the 
privacy of our homes to receive as well as discuss differing views. 
Wnile your memo also indicates "there is no way to win politically because of the 
large number of people who insistently and intensely either favor or oppose construction 
of this dam," I too have tried to divorce politics from my determination and perhaps 
as an Independent Governor not concerned with or seeking re-election or election to 
any office, I have had some relief from pressure groups and what you also refer to 
as "special interests" to the extent that I have probably been spared some of the 
pressure that was applied to you in your decision. 
On that note, as you are undoubtedly aware, there is considerable speculation that the 
White House is currently directly or indirectly playing "political games" on-this 
question by virtue of the fact they have "impounded" or at least "embargoed" the 
Final Environmental Impact Statement which was promised as late or as early as August 
17th by the Corps of Engineers. However, I want to be extremely fair to the Corps 
and specifically to Colonel Chandler who I think has been outstanding and a credit 
to the United States Army, the White House and to the people of America. I say this 
because you are well aware and one or more mutual friends have told you and I, that the 
press frequently reports the Corps of Engineers "plays games" or has been accused in 
the past on other projects of having total disregard for the land or the water or the 
environment, and that it wants to build projects anywhere or everywhere to justify 
its existence and its budget and too frequently proceeds on the basis that "the end 
justifies the means." From my standpoint, this type of accusation and criticism is 
totally unfair as it relates to Colonel Chandler and the Corps of Engineers regarding 
the Dickey-Lincoln Project. I have nothing but commendation as well as pride and 
appreciation for the fair method and manner with which Colonel Chandler has treated 
the citizens of Maine and this Governor during the course of his studies and hearings 
and his responsiveness on the Dickey-Lincoln Project. Therefore, while I do not want 
to lend any credence to criticism of you or the White House, I would say that if political 
games are being played in withholding the FEIS until after the present election on 
November 7th or later, or until there is a new Congressional Delegation and/or Governor 
of Maine....I have already received sufficient information relative to the FEIS so that 
I feel I am able to make a final decision and my recommendation to you as President. 
In other words, even though I am advised there is some unhappiness on 'the part of your 
staff with the Corps of Engineers or the FEIS on a Section ^04 problem or sufficient 
detail concerning wet lands or fisheries and wildlife, I am advised that they are incon-
sequential and de minimus as it relates to the total project and the overwhelming facts 
and factors that we have already studied. As a matter of fact, based on your previous 
expression on water projects and budgetary concerns for waste and bureaucracy and 
your excellent anti-inflationary challenge, I cannot believe you would follow any 
different approach as Governor of Maine or as Governor of Georgia than I am forwarding 
today. 
Also, more than coincidentally, I share completely and unequivocally the additional 
statements contained in your memorandum of October 1, 1973 on the Georgia project, 
which convey rrr/ strong and unequivocal feelings on the State of Maine project, to wit: 
"As Governor, as an outdoorsman, as a businessman interested in the optimum economic 
development of Georgia (Maine) , and as one who perhaps will make the final decision on 
this project, I have tried to assess fairly all factors involved." Very candidly, I 
feel this applies equally to the State of Maine - unless you now as President of the 
United States apply a different standard to an independent Governor of Maine than you 
expected and obviously received from a ?epublican President out of respect to you as 
the Democratic Governor of Georgia in 1973. 
Another excellent sentiment and quote from your very judicious memorandum demonstrates 
once again there is a very strong similarity of resolution as well as in approach between 
one Jimmy Carter and one Jim Longley to the extent you also said. — 
"in my mind there is no doubt that I have made the correct recommendation or 
decision." 
As a former Governor, now the President of the United States, you have also indicated 
and I will new reiterate that "it is impossible to analyze in a brief statement all 
the complicated and constantly changing issues" ... but you will find enclosed herewith 
an in-depth analysis of the major points of consideration and my conclusion, based on 
the best expertise provided me and my own analysis and research that 
"THE PROPOSED DICKEY-LINCOLN WATER PROJECT, AS PRESENTLY CONSTITUTED, WOULD BE 
GROSSLY UNFAIR TO THE PRESENT AND FUTURE GENERATIONS OF MAINE PEOPLE AND A 
WASTE OF FEDERAL AND STATE OF MAINE TAXPAYER DOLLARS 
AND I, THEREFORE, AS GOVERNOR OF MAINE, DO IN FACT EXPRESS MY OPPOSITION TO 
THIS PROJECT AND RESPECTFULLY REQUEST THAT YOU AS PRESIDENT SUPPORT THIS 
RECOMMENDATION." 
More than coincidentally, I felt that it would also be inflationary as well as a slap-
in-the-face and a breach of faith to the voters of Maine for this Governor, or any 
Governor of Maine for that matter, to do other than strongly oppose this project as 
presently contemplated based on the facts and the overwhelming expression of the voters 
of Maine in opposition_to a public power question in 1973. Furthermore, my recommendation 
that you deny this project or avoid further waste of taxpayer dollars on this specific 
project is based on the following additional specifics: 
(1) The voters of Maine in 1973 overwhelmingly voted against public power and at the 
very least, a Governor should not approve or even condone or support any effort toward 
state or federal public power projects in Maine, in denial of the due process as 
demonstrated at the ballot box by the voters of Maine in 1973 , without allowing the 
voters of Maine to vote on any public power project, federal or state. 
(2) Separate and apart from the public power issue, I oppose this project because despite 
very obvious advantages of federal dollars and/or job benefits, the adverse impacts of 
"the bust cycle" and the destruction, or at the very least, negative disruption of a 
beautiful river plus the land and natural resources combined with a negative social 
economic impact on present and future generations of Maine people far outweigh any 
present short range economic advantages. 
(3) Despite repeated attempts and requests of supporters of the project and despite 
diligent research and analysis by independent and state government expertise, I have 
been provided with very little evidence, almost totally speculative, that there is any 
substantial economic or environmental benefit for the people of Maine once the project 
is completed. On the other hand, I have given great consideration to an excellent point 
made by our mutual good friend, Senator Ed Muskie, to the effect that "once the project 
is completed and water starts flowing, it is very unlikely the unit cost(s) will ever 
increase." 
(4) Despite extensive research and development of cost benefit data as it relates to 
present and future energy considerations, there is lack of convincing evidence that 
this is the best present form of energy development for the State of Maine and the 
region or the nation as it relates to either long range or short range energy 
advantage(s) and/or even a comparative advantage as it relates to the potential for 
one or more alternatives in the form of improved conservation, nuclear, tidal, wood, 
solar, wind, methanol, hydro, including present small dam capability here in Maine, 
let alone exciting developments my research has uncovered in the areas of improved 
technological and scientific developments in refinery capability, offshore both 
surface as well as ocean floor development, predicated on the submarine expertise 
and experience with which you are familiar, which could actually lead to ocean floor 
refineries and/or communities involved with energy as well as aquaculture development. 
Yes, we have done both our homework and the time spent in research and in studying 
this problem is at least the equal of what you indicated directly and I have heard 
indirectly you invested in behalf of the people of Georgia. I want you to know that 
I have done this not only in behalf of the people of Maine, but by virtue of the 
changing energy picture since your decision in 1973. I have also very carefully con-
sidered the problem and the potential benefit of Dickey-Lincoln as it relates to the 
region and the nation as well, by virtue of the emergence of the^energy program even 
though I am not certain I agree with your extreme position that it is "the moral 
equivalent of war." However, to the extent your statement was a challenge to America, 
then I think Americans - including this Governor - have tried to be responsive and 
as Dr. Schlesinger well knows, this Governor was among the first - if not the first -
to initially embrace your energy objectives, subject to minor refinements, and I was 
also most responsive to the calls from your staff, including Dr. Schlesinger in recent 
norths, in seeking the support of the Maine Congressional Delegation and others, for 
your program. So, I am as delighted as you must be to see that the Congress has finally 
passed energy legislation. 
For your further information and background, I am also sharing with you additional 
specifics with respect to the research and thinking and factors we carefully studied 
and analyzed in the following areas: 
(1) Thousands of Maine citizens have exprssed themselves through numerous forums, 
including the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) process on this project. 
Additionally, I mnimissioruxl a blue-ribbon panel of: Maine citizens as a project review 
coiiinu.tleo to consider the project from the widest possible pors[*>e< t i ve. The State 
Department of Conservation, the State Office of Energy Resources and the State Development-
Office have each conducted independent reviews. Finally, I have spoken to hundreds of 
Maine citizens and individuals from all over our Country with specific expertise relating 
to this project; and personally journeyed to the project site on a number of occasions 
to assure a first-hand knowledge of the location and geography before I reached the 
conclusions and decisions and recommendation as already stated. 
(2) Mr. President, the decisions I have reached are in consonance with Maine's Energy 
Plan which provides for developments only when economically sound and environmentally 
feasible. The economics of this project are questionable at best. Numerous benefit-
cost studies have been done, each with a different conclusion. The myriad of possi-
bilities and the overwhelming uncertainties of the 100-year projections precludes 
definitive economic analysis and thus leaves one the opportunity to pick his own expert 
with his figures to support almost any position. Even the most ardent proponents of 
the Dickey-Lincoln project agree that the environmental impact of Maine's land resources 
are a major consideration. One land use consultant has estimated that the area directly 
affected would be at least 500,000 acres. 
(3) I have come to the conclusion that the St. John River may well be essential to our 
economic health and energy requirements. However, I am not satisfied that we have in 
the Dickey-Lincoln Project the optimum use of the River
1
 s resources. Approximately 
33% of any power benefit derived for Maine from Dickey-Lincoln would not come from the 
project per se, but from downstream Canadian generation at the discretion of the Canadians 
at a cost to be set at some future date. Additionally, Dickey-Lincoln is designed pri-
marily as a.peaking-power project. A Maine-oriented base-load development on the 
St. John would be much more important to Maine's long-term economic health than would 
the present proposal. I ajn advised that very little if any industrial development 
is influenced by peaking power as contrasted by base load power. 
(4) We have embarked on serious considerations of several alternate energy sources for 
Maine. We are anxious to pursue several viable energy opportunities to reduce our 
State's dependence on oil energy. We are convinced that proper integration of the many 
diverse sources available to us can provide a solution that will improve the economy 
immeasurably without the cost or risk of Dickey-Lincoln. Conservation alone can save 
the equivalent of 11,600 ,000 barrels of fuel by 1985. Conservation should not be 
viewed as going without or reducing our standard of living or economic growth, but as 
an attack on wasted energy. Proper building insulation alone would be a major investment; 
however, the results are semi-permanent and significant. A recent study indicates that 
56% of Maine homes now use wood in some form for heating. One of Maine's major industries 
recently chose to build a wood fuel-fired facility over oil or a hydro-electric plant. 
The use of wood for fuel is moving swiftly, and surely now is the time to consider the 
implications of 100% use of Maine's timber growth. These and the integrated and proper 
use of Maine's existing dam sites, the proper utilization of coal, solar> wind, nuclear 
and co-generation are urgent considerations. Every day the Maine Yankee Plant at 
Wiscasset simply dissipates heat equivalent to 960,000 gallons of No. 2 fuel into the 
river. These alternate sources of energy require an injection of research and imple-
mentation effort because they contribute positively to our Balance of Payments and 
inflation problems and reduce our dependence on OPEC. 
(5) One of the major impacts of this project , and one that has not received 
sufficient attention is the devastating impact of the transmission system which 
would cut a swarth through some of Maine's most wild and scenic areas and across 
free-flowing rivers for 206 miles with a 150 foot right of way and require 4,080 
acres. 
In addition to the information which we have supplied in this letter, we 
have also prepared supplemental data and attachments which will be provided you. 
My request, Mr. President, is that you will appreciate the integrity of iry decision, 
to oppose this project for my reasons as already stated to wit: 
"THE PROPOSED DICKEY-LINCOLN WATER PROJECT, AS PRESENTLY CONSTITUTED, WOULD BE 
GROSSLY UNFAIR TO THE PRESENT AND FUTURE GENERATIONS OF MAINE PEOPLE AND A 
WASTE OF FEDERAL AND STATE OF MAINE TAXPAYER DOLLARS. ..AND I, THEREFORE, 
AS GOVERNOR OF MAINE, DO IN FACT EXPRESS MY OPPOSITION TO THIS PROJECT AND 
RESPECTFULLY REQUEST THAT YOU AS PRESIDENT SUPPORT THIS RECOMMENDATION." 
Very truly yours, 
JBL:bh 
cc: Clifford L. Alexander, Jr. , Secretary of the Army 
James T. Mclntyre, Jr., Director of the Office of Management £ Budget 
Charles H . Warren, Chairman, CEQ 
Douglas M. Costle, Administrator, EPA 
General Morriss, Chief of Engineers 
Colonel Chandler, District Engineer 
James Schlesinger, Secretary, Department of Energy 
Maine Congressional Delegation 
ATTACHMENT I 
DICKEY-LINCOLN PROJECT 
PROJECT DESCRIPTION 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
CONSIDERATIONS & CONCLUSIONS 
DECISION 
PROJECT DESCRIPTION 
As proposed, the Dickey-Lincoln School Project would cost approximately 
$1 billion. It would consist of two earthfill structures designed to produce 
peaking and modest intermediate load power from the St. John River The larger 
of the two dams, the Dickey Dam, would be located immediately above the confluence 
of the Allagash and St. John Rivers. The Lincoln School Dam would also be located 
on the Upper St. John River, eleven miles downstream from the Dickey Dam. 
The Dickey Dam would have a total length of 10,600 feet and a maximum height 
of 335 feet. The Lincoln School Dam is considerably smaller and would be 1,600 
feet long and have a maximum height of 85 feet. 
The project would be operated principally, although not totally, as a 
peaking power plant. The peaking power aspect does not require a high energy 
producing facility, it would operate for short periods to meet the daily peak 
electrical demands of New England. The initial installed capacity of the project 
would be 840 MW with a future potential of 1,210 MW. The operation of Dickey Dam's 
power facilities can vary from 2^ hours daily for seven days a week to 3% hours 
daily for five days a week. The large storage capacity of the lake would be 
replenished by the spring runoff, metered during the summer, and reach its lowest 
level when drawn down to help meet the high winter peak need for electrical energy 
in Mew England. 
The Lincoln School Dam can normally operate 10 hours per day, seven days a 
week. Although this dam is designed to regulate and even out the St. John River 
flow, it also provides some flood prevention benefits, as well as base power for 
part of Northern Maine. 
In the event of an electrical blackout, the Project is capable of generating 
electricity for a continuous period of up to 35 days. But, under normal conditions 
the Project will generate electricity only 3 hours a day for 12 months a year 
Dickey-Lincoln is designed to supply peaking power to all of New England 
via some 400 miles of high voltage transmission lines connecting the Northern 
Aroostook generating plants with the Southern New England load centers. Under 
the preference provisions, under which the power is marketed by the Department of the 
Interior, small amounts of base load power could be delivered to Maine users served 
by Maine's utilities. Additional discussion of the "Preference Clause" is provided 
in Attachment IV. 
In addition to the description of the Project itself, I feel there are other 
major factors which should be highlighted. 
(1) The construction of the Project would most certainly have a economic 
impact on Maine, particularly Northern Maine. Conservative estimates have placed 
the economic impact at $800 million; it would more likely approach $1 billion. 
(2) Construction of the dams would require the displacement of the entire 
community of Allagash. The loss of this entire community must be viewed as a 
major consideration. 
(3) The Project would account for between 15 and 20 percent of the New 
England regions peaking capacity requirements by the 1980's. However, the Project 
would account for less than three percent (3%) of the total energy requirements 
of the region. 
(4) Approximately 88,000 acres would be flooded by the Project, and a 
Department of Conservation study indicates that an additional 205,000 acres of 
forest land would be isolated from Maine wood markets to the extent that access 
and egress would be through Canada for the most part. New transmission line rights-
of-way and associated access roads would require another 4,083 acres. These figures 
certainly indicate that the Project has a major impact on Maine land resources, all 
of which are now privately owned and would be subject to eminent domain seizure. 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
/ 
The re is little Question but that the construction of the Project would 
have a major, adverse environmental impact- There appears to be little dispute 
in this area, even from the most ardent proponents of the Project. 
Overall, from the standpoint of the stability and productivity of the 
existing natural environment, the Project will clearly have an adverse impact. 
One consultant has estimated that due to the shape and location of reservoirs, 
the effect on roads and mills, acreage for mitigation of wildlife habitat, 
dams, transmission lines and access roads, the area directly affected is at 
least 500,000 acres. In addition, there will be adverse impact on a beautiful 
and aesthetic river and land, as well as some unfavorable impact to future 
productivity of major acreage of commercial forest land due to the impoundment 
and buffer zone, transmission lines and isolation. 
The Project would, in addition to despoiling one of the few remaining real 
wild areas and free-flowing rivers in the Eastern United States, also would 
unfortunately have transmission lines cross primitive wild areas and rivers in 
Northern Maine, as well as create a ditch-type environment on beautiful fields, 
countryside and areas bordering some of our most beautiful towns and recreation 
and wi Idlife areas . 
Some of the most productive forest lands in the watershed occur within the 
area are to be inundated. 88,000 acres would be flooded by the project. New 
transmission line right-of-ways and access roads would require 4,083 acres. 13,400 
acres of forest land would exist as islands, being less accessible for harvesting. 
An additional 206,000 acres of forest land would be isolated from Maine wood 
industry markets. 
White water canoeing and wilderness camping would be adversely impacted, 
if not in fact destroyed, in the Project area. The new benefits from man-made 
recreation attractions will largely depend on the investments in facilities such 
as campsites, beaches, nature trails, etc., and the vagaries of the lake fishery. 
CONSIDERATIONS EVALUATED AND CONCLUSIONS REACHED 
(1) A decision on this Project cannot be reached solely on the basis of 
economic considerations. We do not have a right, in this generation, to commit 
a significant portion of our valuable wilderness land to a project based solely 
on the fact that it will temporarily stimulate the economy by a construction 
boom because the risk to future generations of a bust cycle far offsets the potential 
long-term value of the boom cycle. Additionally, the Project certainly could not be 
justified by the number of permanent jobs it would create. Finally, analysis of the 
several proposed cost-benefit computations with their several different interest 
rates, the myriad of possible considerations, and the overwhelming uncertainties of 
one hundred years, precludes definitive or accurate economic analysis and thus leaves 
one the opportunity to pick and choose at will a set of figures supplied by one's 
favorite expert to support almost any position, (see Attachment II ) 
(2) The Project should not be rejected solely on the basis that it would 
represent a loss of scenic or wilderness areas to be used by present and future 
generations for recreation purposes. 
(3) Maine must assume the responsibi1ity of providing a fair share of the energy 
needs of the state and the nation. Statistics show that Maine has been providing its 
fair share of electrical energy in New England and we must continue to make this so. 
DECISION 
(1) The federal government is still struggling to develop a clear energy policy and 
direction; and it simply is not reasonable to suggest that Maine endorse the Dickey-
Lincoln Project in this vacuum. To do so would not be unlike placing one tiny piece of a 
large and complex puzzle on a table and waiting to see if the unknown parts will 
ultimately fit. 
(2) Maine will continue to assume its full responsibility to shoulder its fair 
share of the energy burden without undertaking this project at this time, which would have, 
as I view it, minimal returns for a maximum sacrifice. 
(3) I have stated on many occasions that I do not feel any individual or group 
has the luxury to oppose each and every energy proposal on environmental grounds without 
providing viable alternatives to the energy problem. We do not have a right to say what 
we are against without saying what we are for so that realistic trade-offs and viable 
compromises can be reached. 
Therefore, while I oppose the construction of the Dickey-Lincoln Project, I will 
support for the remainder of my term as Governor, and as a future private citizen, the 
following: 
(1) Continued planning and construction of Maine's base-load generating 
capabilities. 
(2) Accelerated resource and development of the construction of additional nuclear 
facilities with reasonable safeguards relating to safety and waste disposals. In that 
regard, I am on this date advising all concerned state departments and agencies of the 
urgency of the energy problem, the need to expedite and shorten long lead-times and to give 
priority consideration, wvthjji the scope of Maine's existing laws, to requests for permits 
and licenses. I am convinced that Maine can continue to produce its share of base-
load electricity without endangering its unique environment. 
(3) I am this date directing the Office of Energy Resources to accelerate their 
programs to develop alternative solutions to have Maine provide its fair share of "peaking" 
capabilities. This should include progress reports on the utilization and impact of a 
series of smaller hydro projects on Maine's rivers, tidal projects, nuclear proposals, 
and pumped storage possibilities with a formal plan to cooperate with private utilities 
on a conservation program, particularly during peak periods in Maine or during periods 
when Maine should conserve to accommodate peaks in other areas of New England. 
(4) Should there be continued efforts in the future to proceed with the 
Dickey-Lincoln Project, I would ask the Maine Legislature to take whatever action is 
necessary to see that all the citizens of the State of Maine are given an opportunity 
to express their opinions on the Project at the ballot box. In making my own decision 
to oppose the Project, I could not ignore the fact that as recent as November, 1973,the 
people of Maine were given the opportunity to speak to the Public Power issue and they 
overwhelmingly defeated... .at the ballot box. .a Public Power referendum. Construction 
of the Dickey-Lincoln Project by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to be operated by a public 
authority could, in effect, be a backdoor approach to bringing Public Power to Maine to the 
extent that it establishes a New England Public Power Project at the expense of Maine 
landowners and both federal and state taxpayers. That being the case, I consider it only 
reasonable and appropriate that the citizens of Maine would at the very least be given the 
opportunity to reverse this expression prior to any support at the State level No public 
official should circumvent the position of a majority of the people of a state once it 
has been expressed at the ballot box. 
A summary of Pros and Cons for many of the elements considered in reaching this decision 
is contained in Attachment II. 
ATTACHMENT II 
DICKEY-LINCOLN PROJECT 
Decision Matrix 
Summary 
Pros and Cons 
AREAS OF CONCERN 
A. Energy Economics 
a. Energy Demand 
b. Energy Alternatives 
c. Construction Economics 
d. Marketing 
B. Community and Economic Impacts 
a. Relocation 
b. Job Impacts 
c. Flood Control 
C. Environmental Impacts 
a. Terrestrial Ecosystem 
b. Forest Resources 
c. Wildlife 
d. Fisheries 
e. Recreation 
f. Land Uses 
g. Geology and Safety 
D. Conservation 
AREAS OF CONCERN 
A. ENERGY ECONOMICS 
This summary is heavily dependent upon the energy analysis for the Dickey-
Lincoln School Project prepared by Acres-American Inc. under contract with the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers. 
Reports indicate that, in the absence of major changes in lifestyles, the capacity 
of the Dickey-Lincoln project may be needed in the 1980's Sub-Section a presents the 
pro and con arguments in the area of ENERGY DEMAND. 
Sub-Section b considers the following Energy Alternatives: 
Dircct Generation 
Nuclear-Steam Cycle 
Conventional Fossil Thermal Steam Cycle 
Gas Turbines 
Hydroelectric 
Combined Cycle 
Power Purchases 
Solar Wind 
Small Hydro 
Tidal 
Energy Storage 
Conventional Pumped Hydro 
Lead-acid Batteries 
Compressed Air Storage 
It is important to note that, although Dickey-Lincoln is a peak load plant, both 
peak load plants and base load plants when combined with a storage capability can be 
considered alternatives to Dickey-Lincoln. Geothermal sources were rejected because 
of unproven resources and economics in the New England area. Advanced nuclear cycles 
such as the "breeder reactor" were excluded since they are not likely to replace the 
c onventional reactor in the U.S. nuclear scene before 1990 and fusion applications 
probably not 'til the turn of the century. 
SUB-SECTION c, CONSTRUCTION ECONOMICS, reviews the findings of the economic analysis 
for the project and presents the controversies regarding the methodologies used by 
the Corps in undertaking the economic assessments of the project. 
SUB-SECTION d, MARKETING, reviews the marketing and strategy for power, the allocation 
of a portion of the base load power to Maine, most of the peaking capacity to southern 
New England and concerns with the "Preference Clause" 
*NOTE: 
Pro and con statements address specifically the sub-headed subject 
per se. 
ENERGY DEMAND 
A. ENERGY ECONOMICS (Continued) 
Pros 
1. NEEPOOL projects that power demands 
in New England will grow at 5.4% 
annually indicating a need for 
peaking power such as could be 
provided by the Dickey-Lincoln 
Project. The New England Regional 
Commission energy project made a similar 
projection. An alternative 
projection by the Corps consultant 
reported an annual growth 
rate of 5.2% which also indicates 
a future need for Dickey-Lincoln 
energy. 
2. The project would account for between 
15 and 20 percent of the New England 
regions "peaking capacity" require-
ments by the 1980*s. 
3. Private power projections 
indicate that Maine will need 
additional pcwer - both base load 
and peaking by the time Dickey-
Lincoln is on line. 
4. Load Management and Conservation 
can reduce generating capability 
requirements, however, that 
reduction in capacity require-
ments will not eliminate the 
need for additions to the system 
based upon future demand 
requirements. In addition, 
Load Management depends upon 
changing State laws (PUC regu-
lations) . 
5. The public and industries expect 
government and utilities to 
assure an energy supply with 
minimum impact on living standards. 
6. Many households shifting to wood are 
installing electricity as a backup 
source of heat. 
Cons 
1. All forecasts are based on industry 
figures and may not be an accurate 
measure of what capacity is actually 
needed in the future. An independ-
ent assessment of future demand 
is needed. 
2. The project would account for less 
than 3% of the energy requirements c 
the New England Region. 
3. Maine exports power. The project is 
for New England benefit - Maine does 
not need it. 
Industry is not interested in peak 
power. New industry is induced by 
a significant differential in the 
cost of base power. 
4. Load Management and serious 
Conservation efforts could reduce 
the need for future peaking power 
and, therefore, Dickey-Lincoln. 
5. Approximately 33% of any base power 
derived for Maine would not come 
frcan the project but from downstrear 
Canadian generation at the 
discretion of the Canadians where 
no treaty or agreement exists to 
assure an economical and continuous 
supply. 
b. ENERGY ALTERNATIVES A. ENERGY ECONOMICS (Continued) 
i- Nuclear and Conventional Fossil 
Thermal Steam Cycle Alternative 
Pros 
1. Both nuclear and conventional fossil 
thermal steam plants are designed 
for base load pcwer generation. These 
plants operate most efficiently at 
fixed and continuous levels of 
operation as opposed to the inter-
mittent operation of peaking plants. 
It is prohibitively expensive to 
regularly vary the level of output 
at these thermal steam plants 
or to build a thermal steam plant 
primarily as a peak load plant. 
Cons 
1. Although nuclear and fossil fuel 
cannot be considered as direct 
alternatives to Dickey-Lincoln as 
peak power plants, they must be 
considered as one component in an 
alternative mix. Nuclear and fossi. 
fuel base plants can produce off 
peak power to be stored for use 
during peaking periods. The storage 
options include conventional pumped 
hydro, lead-acid batteries, 
compressed air storage and 
underground pumped hydro. Each of 
these is discussed separately in 
the section on power storage 
alternatives. 
2. Whether or not these base load plants 
can produce off-peak power to be 
stored and sold during peak periods at 
prices competitive with Dickey-
Lincoln over the long run is not 
certain. 
2. The uncertainties here relate to 
the future price and availability 
of oil, coal, and uranium; and to 
the technological developments in 
in the breeder reactor. 
3. Nuclear energy is, and must be, a 
component of the nations energy 
supply. The Maine Yankee facility 
has been immensely successful. 
3. Nuclear wastes are a national 
responsibility and proper storage 
must be rapidly demonstrated 
along with a better understanding 
by the public of nuclear develop-
ments. 
4. The Maine Yankee nuclear power facility 
at Wiscasset, Maine generates 10 times 
the power of the proposed Dickey-
LincoLn project with no appreciable 
environmental impact. 
ENERGY ALTERNATIVES (cont.) A. ENERGY ECONOMICS (Continued) 
ii. Gas Turbines Alternative 
Gas turbines were found to be more 
expensive than Dickey-Lincoln. They 
are expected to be even more so over 
the long run as the price of the fuel 
(Oil) for the gas turbines continues 
to increase. 
The Acres-American Study found Gas 
Turbines to be an alternative to 
Dickey-Lincoln. The Citizen' s 
Impact Review Committee concurred. 
Although Gas Turbines are more 
expensive than Dickey-Lincoln, the 
environmental problems are generally 
minimal. 
Gas Turbines run on an oil-based 
fuel. 
iii. Conventional Hydro with Storage Capacity 
for Peaking Alternative 
Pros 
Gas Turbines can be constructed 
near the load center to minimize 
transmission losses and the need to 
construct new transmission systems. 
Oil-based fuel is subject to OPEC 
vacillations and also impacts 
adversely on balance-of-payments and 
national inflation problems. 
Cons 
1. The benefit to cost ratio for these 
alternatives was in no case more 
than one. 
According to the U.S. Army Corps 
consultant, approximately 1,000 MW o 
capacity is available from six New 
England hydro sites with individual 
capacities of 90 MW or more. In 
terms of the amount of peaking power 
this is an alternative to Dickey-
Lincoln. 
2. Of the six sites mentioned only one 
(Cold Stream, CMP) is being given 
serious consideration by the Private 
Sector. 
The benefit to cost ratio of 
Conventional Hydro is only mildly 
subject to inflation. 
3. These relatively high capacity hydro 
facilities (needed to generate 
peaking power) would require impound-
ments inevitably causing a disruption 
of the natural ecology of the water 
course and surrounding area. These 
environmental impacts although more 
dispersed, could be as significant 
as those of the Dickey-Lincoln Project 
iv. Combined Cycle Alternatives 
1 Combined cyclc plants utilize oil as 
fuel. 
1. Combined cycle plants (combine gas 
turbines and conventional thermal 
stc£im plants) have a very good load 
following capacity. 
2. The gas turbine is more competitive 
in producing peaking power. 
^ENERGY ALTERNATIVES (cont.)
 A
' ENERGY ECONOMICS (Continued) 
v. Power Purchases Alternative 
1. Depending heavily upon purchased 
power is uncertain over the long 
run. Since hydropower development 
in Canada is publicly funded, it is 
likely that Maine would lose this 
power as Canadian demand grows over 
the long run. There is no data 
at this point on the price at 
which this power would be 
marketed. Is it certain that 
the Canadians will build the Dam and 
construct transmission lines which 
could efficiently transport the 
power to Maine. 
1. New England can purchase capacity 
from outside the region to meet its 
needs. The Canadian government 
intention is to pursue the Gull 
Island Hydro Project on the lower 
Churchill River in New found land 
indicates a- potential source of 
peaking capacity for Maine. 
It is possible that Maine might 
be able to purchase firm 
capacity from this $3 billion 
project which is expected to 
provide surplus capacity to 
Canada. 
2. In August, Vermont announced 
the conclusion of a tentative 
agreement with Quebec for the 
purchase of at least 55 mega-
watts of power for a period of 
20-30 years. The price yet to 
be negotiated, but with 
deliveries starting perhaps as 
early as 1981. Vermont's 
Electric Power Authority has 
indicated it could also carry 
Quebec's electricity to other 
American states. 
^Additional aspects relating to Canadian Power purchases is contained in Attachment VI. 
ENERGY ALTERNATIVES (cont.) A. ENERGY ECONOMICS (Continued) 
vi. Solar Alternative 
Pros 
1. The most efficient application of 
solar energy is in the heating and 
cooling of buildings. 
2. Solar energy will not produce depend-
able peak load power. 
3. Solar energy is not particularly 
suited to the New England Region. 
vii. Wind Alternative 
1. Wind is not a reliable source of 
power. The amount of wind that 
can be produced at any moment 
is unpredictable. 
2. Capital cost of wind generators are 
high and the maintenance costs are 
yet undefined. 
viii. * Small Hydro Alternative 
1. Small hydro (run of the river) does 
not have storage capacity and would 
not be a viable alternative for 
winter peaking power. 
*See Attachment VII f o r d i s c u s s i o n of 
s m a l l hydro a l ternat ive f o r Maine . 
ix. Tidal Alternative 
1. At this time Passamaquoddy is not 
as cost-effective as Dickey-Lincoln 
according to the Army Corps 
of Engineers. 
2. Periods of peak generation for 
tidal plants depend upon the 
tides and frequently do not 
correspond with periods of peak 
demand. 
3. Double effect scbemos require the 
sacrifice of some energy benefit 
to achieve some firm peaking capacity. 
Cons 
1. The application of solar energy, although 
limited, is growing steadily and is 
relatively expensive. 
Solar energy could be used to produce 
off-peak power which could be stored. 
1. Wind considered in conjunction with a 
storage system could be a reliable 
source of power. 
2. The economics are still uncertain. 
Wind power could become competitive 
as the various sources become more 
expensive. 
1. President Carter's National Energy 
Policy and the Army Corps of Engineers 
have indicated that there are a number 
of sites for small hydro 
that be utilized for energy 
production. 
1. Tidal power in Passamaquoddy and Cobscook 
Bays in Maine, looked at over the long 
run, is an economic source of power. A 
recent life-cycle analysis of the 
Passamaquoddy project indicates that 
the project could well be economically 
feasible. It is still being studied 
by the Corps. 
2. Double-effect schemes for tidal projects 
can be designed to provide sane firm 
peaking capacity at an increased cost. 
3. Large-scale tidal projects have major 
environmental impacts. 
A. ENERGY ECONOMICS (Continued) 
ENERGY ALTERNATIVES (cont.) 
3. 
4. 
Conventional Pumped Hydro Alternative 
Pros 
Because of pumping and generating 
inefficiencies there is a net loss 
in energy production from pumped 
storage. A pumped storage plant 
normally generates only 65 to 75 
percent of the energy used for pumping. 
The pumping energy cost evaluation 
was based on variable unclear fuel 
costs of 3.6 mills per KWH and 
variable O&M costs of .15 mills 
per KWH. These pumping costs will 
increase in the future inflating the 
cost of pumped storage. There is also 
the question of whether low cost 
base load power will be available for 
New England in the late 198O's. 
This is an uncertainty at the 
present time. 
The cost of pumped hydro was not 
determined on a site specific basis. 
They were based on averages and 
cannot therefore be considered as 
dependable estimates for individual 
sites such as Site Leo in Maine. 
Pumped hydro in Maine would require 
an excess base load power frcm 
nuclear or fossil fuel generating 
stations. 
Cons 
A total of 52 potential sites for 
conventional pumped storage ranging 
in size from 275 MW to 7930 NW have 
been identified in New England. 
If the cost calculations for Site Leo 
were done on an equal basis with 
Dickey-Lincoln (i.e., same interest 
rate and insurance costs) Site Leo could 
well be more competitive. 
The economy of pumped storage results 
from the conversion of low-cost, off-
peak energy to high value peak energy. 
The environmental impact is minimal. 
A number of the pumped storage sites, 
including Site Leo in Maine, have the 
same capacity as Dickey-Lincoln but 
have much less an environmental impact 
at the site of the dam. Site Leo 
has 1,000 MW capacity and only floods 
3,385 acres as opposed to Dickey-
Lincoln with an installed capacity of 
830 KW impacting on hundreds of 
thousands of acres. 
\ 
A. ENERGY ECONOMICS (Continued) 
ENERGY ALTERNATIVES (cont.) 
xii. liead-acid Batteries Alternative 
Pros 
1. The economics of battery storage 
like all other storage alterna-
require a supply of low cost 
off peak energy. 
2. Assuming mass production, capital 
costs are eventually expected to be 
competitive with conventional energy 
storage systems such as pumped hydro. 
3. Battery plants can be located near the 
load center, therefore diminishing 
the need for transmission lines and 
decreasing transmission losses. 
xiii. Coirpressed Air Alternative 
1. The worlds first plant is currently 
under construction in Germany. 
Cons 
1. The lead-acid battery is predicted 
to be commercially available in plar 
as large as 800 MW with up to 10 
hours of storage by about 1990. 
2. At the present time batteiv storage 
is more expensive than conventional 
pumped hydro. 
3. Environmentally, there are potent^vi 
problems with battery plants 
associated with the ultimate dispos£ 
of spent electrolyte and the danger 
of accidental spillage. 
1. The economics of compressed air 
storage has yet to be proven and it, 
as other storage systems, depend on 
the availability of excess base load 
power. 
2. Research indicates that compressed 
air storage systems can be developed 
with installed capacity of between 2,000 
and 3,000 MW. 
xiv. Conservation 
1. The State Office of Energy Resources 
has calculated that optimum conservation 
measures in Maine can save, by 1985, an 
annual equivalent of 11,600,000 barrels 
of Number 2 fuel oil. Savings in space 
heating alone by reducing Maine thermo-
stats to 60° would save approximately 
1,680,000 barrels of Number 2 fuel oil 
which is approximately 80% of the total 
annual production of the Dickey-Lincoln 
project. 
1. A public attitude must be developed 
that conservation is not doing 
without, but using energy efficientl 
so that we can do more with less 
and eliminate all waste. 
A. ENERGY ECONOMICS (continued) 
CONSTRUCTION ECONOMICS 
Pros Cons 
1. The cost benefit ratio of the 1 
project as calculated by the Corps 
is 2.1 to 1 based on an interest rate 
of 3 1/4%. 
2. The Corps calculated the cost benefit 2 
ratio to be 1.2 to 1 at the 6 3/8% 
Federal funds rate of interest used 
for other Federal Water Projects. The 
Corps favorable cost benefit ratio 
incorporated power from downstream 
Canadian generation; and there is no 
cost or treaty agreement to assure 
a continuous economical supply. 
3. The true benefits of Dickey-Lincoln are 3 
very significantly understated because 
the benefits of the project are measured 
in terms of fixed prices for alterna-
tives. If the benefit cost analysis 
recognized that the cost of alternative 
non-renewable sources of power will 
increase but the non-capital costs of 
Dickey-Lincoln are nearly fixed (which 
is certainly realistic) then the 
benefit cost ratio for Dickey-Lincoln 
over the long-run could be over-
whelmingly positive. 
4. From a purely economic point of view, 4 
the project construction will be 
beneficial to Maine. 
The interest rate of 3 1/4% is 
inappropriate and a higher rate 
could make the project unfeasible. 
Even the 6 3/4% is perhaps too low, 
as government projects are not 
subject to taxes, and therefore, 
the true cost is understated. 
Federal benefit to cost assessments 
are done with fixed prices. Dickey-
JuLncoln should be, as well. Elec-
tricity produced from hydro power 
will increasingly become cheaper to 
produce as oil and gas supplies 
dwindle and nuclear and coal costs 
rise to meet safety and anti-
pollution requirements. 
One consultant used the 8 1/2% rate 
which more closely approximates the 
market prime interest rate in mid-
1978. This produces a benefit-cost 
ratio of .95 to 1. Eliminating 
project credits for re-development 
and downstream benefits for the 
reduced ration to .87 to 1. The Federal 
Power Commission makes a further 
adjustment of 5.1% for taxes. This 
would further reduce the ratio to .67 
to 1. 
* See Attachment VIII for the computations of Professor Lawrence G. Hines, 
Dartmouth College; Hanover, NH 
A. ENERGY ECONOMICS (Continued) 
PROS 
d. MARKETING 
Maine is scheduled to receive 44% of 
the total energy procuded by the project: 
The intermediate pcwer will be available 
for Maine. 
In addition to the pcwer generated by 
the project, 175 killowatt hours of pcwer 
could be available from arrangements are 
pursued. 
* Preferences Clauses for the sale of 
Federal power require that first 
preference in marketing be given to 
cooperatives and municipals. The largest 
cooperative is in Washington County which 
is not a prosperous County. 
NEPOOL members (private utilities in New 
England) who formally opposed the project in 
the past now have taken a neutral position on 
the project, recognizing the need for future 
peaking power in New England. 
CONS 
Maine will receive only 22% of the 
capacity of the project. Approx-
imately 33% of the power benefit 
derived for Maine would cane frcm 
downstream Canadian generation for 
which there is no agreement 
regarding cost of delivery. 
This intermediate po^er will not 
eliminate the need for new 
generating capacity for Maine, nor 
will it provide the significant 
cost differential necessary to 
attract industry. 
There are no treaties or guarantees 
that any part of the Canadian po.v- r 
will be made available in the 
United States at reasonable prices. 
The project espouses the develop-
ment of public power overwhelmingly 
rejected by Maine voters. 
The NEPOOL private utilities are 
concerned that if the Preference 
Clause is not modified, they will 
not be able to utilize Dickey-
Lincoln power for their customers. 
Under the Preference Clause, 
cus tamer-owned cooperatives and 
municipals would have first 
preference for the power. 
* See Attachment IV for further discussion of the "Preference Clause
1, 
B. COMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS 
If the Dickey-Lincoln School Project was constructed, families would be 
displaced fron their hones, forest industry jobs would be lost, and scrne dislocations 
would take place in the agricultural sector. However, the area would experience 
eight years of economic boom. Sixty-eight permanent jobs would be created. The 
Upper St. John River would benefit frcm flood control. This Section looks at 
Corrmunity and Economic impacts of the project in irore detail. The information and 
ideas presented here lean heavily upon the Department of Conservation's analysis 
of the project, E.C. Jordan's work as a consultant fo the Army Corps of Engineers 
on the project, as well as the work of numerous consultants and specialists 
in related fields. 
a. RELOCATIONS 
PROS CONS 
1. The 161 families would be relocated at 
Federal government expense, considering 
the area flooded this is a relatively 
small number of people to be dislocated, 
1. 161 families from the Allagash 
area will be uprooted by the 
project. The community life of 
these people would be altered 
significantly. 
The negative social and cultural problems 
projected for the boon period of 
construction never materialized in 
expansions at Hinckley, Jay, or during 
the construction of Maine Yankee at Wiscasset 
2. The culture and lifesytles of 
residents of the project area will 
be adversely affected by out-of-
state workers. 
The more urban environments of 
Hinckley, Jay and Wiscasset can 
not accurately be compared to 
the rustic Allagash area. 
Fully 42 percent of the jobs resulting from * 3. 
construction would be taken by persons from out-
of state. In-state jobs that would be created 
might well have a long-range negative impact to 
the extent they would draw from other permanent, 
vital industries and activities in Aroostook County, 
such as potato farming which already has labor 4. 
problems- A boom-town atmosphere would most cer-
tainly bring about problems in such areas as 
alcohol and drug usage, and a resulting increase 
in traffic accidents and fatalities. The State 
would certainly have to anticipate a strain on 
its social service agencies and there would be 
additional stress on the State budget due to 
welfare and unemployment demands during periods 
of layoffs or work stoppages. These are elements 
which cannot be measured, but which must be considered. 
The bocm bust effect during the 
construction phase would strain 
housing, schools, roads, 
utilities, cemeteries, and 
other facilities in nearby towns. 
Unless provisions are made, taxes 
accruing to the involved townships 
and the State would be lost; 
amounting to $97,000 for forest 
land and $40,000 to the Town of 
Allagash. 
* 
B. COMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS (Continued) 
b. 'JOB IMPACTS 
PROS CONS 
1. The construction inpact will last 1. 
eight years with peak employment of 
1,900 people. The total wage and 
salary bill is expected to be approx-
imately $100 million- Fifty-eight 
percent of the construction jobs are 
expected to go to Maine residents 
according to E. C. Jordan Study. 
Forty-two percent of the construction jobs 
are expected to go non-residents. 
2. The average wages earned during 2. 
construction will be far higher 
than those currently earned in the 
region. According to the Davis-
Bacon Act, wages for construction 
workers would equal those paid in 
other Federal projects. 
The higher wages paid at the project could 
raise the overall wage rates in the region. 
This could adversely affect small farmers 
and other small businesses that might not 
be able to offer labor at the higher price. 
3. The construction bocm spending, 
including the multiplier effect 
would strengthen the economy of 
Aroostook County and the Maine 
econcmy as a whole. 
4. Land east of the St. John which 
now sends wood to Canada would be 
cut off from Canadian markets and 
would be more accessible to Maine 
mills. 
3. Maine's forest economy would be 
negatively affected when 110,939 
acres of forest land (impoundment, 
buffer zone, and the transmission lines) 
are taken out of production. 
4. 206,000 acres of forest land would 
be isolated from Maine wood markets. 
A DCC Study found that the power 
savings exceed the losses in income 
to Maine people dependent on the 
forest resource in the impoundment 
area and the buffer zone. 
The job inpact from construction and operation of 
discussed in considerable detail in Attachment V. 
The DOC Study also indicated that under 
current market conditions the loss of this 
would cost the State $58 million, (this was 
discounted at 6%) in wages and salaries. The 
actual loss could be even greater as new 
uses (such as petrochemical feedstock) are 
found for wood. The future value of this 
wood resource cannot be predicted, 
the Dickey-Lincoln School Project is 
c. FLOOD CONTROL 
1. The project has flood control benefits. 1. 
for the urban areas of Fort Kent, 
other canmunities for rural farmlands 
in the area which have been flooded in 
the past after planting. The Army Corps 
of Engineers has estimated the annual 
value of these benefits to be $699,000. 
There are less expensive and more direct 
techniques for reducing flooding of the St. 
John Valley. Dikes have recently been 
built and have proven to be effective. 
Other examples include insurance, flood 
plain regulation, evacuation and a less 
costly local dam. 
C. ENVIROMMENTAL IMPACTS 
The sources of data examined for environmental impacts include the U. S. Army Corps of 
Engineers Environmental Inpact Statements, numerous consultant and private individual 
reports, state agency reviews, and a Corps contracted study with Normandeau Associates 
examining mercury levels in Northern Maine streams, lakes, and fish. 
Overall, from the standpoint of the stability and productivity of the existing natural 
envrionment. the project will have an adverse inpact. The most significant impact will be 
the loss of future productivity from over 80,000 acres of commercial forest land lost to 
the impoundment and buffer zone. The project would also despoil one of the last remaining 
wild areas and free-flowing rivers in the Eastern United States. The transmission lines will 
cross undespoiled wild areas and rivers in Northern Maine. IN all, 0.6% of the state's 
forest resources will be inundated, used for the buffer zone or removed for the transmission 
line right-of-way. Another 1.1% of the state's forest land adjacent to the Canadian border 
will be isolated fron the impoundment and made inaccessible from Maine. 
White water canoeing and wilderness camping would be eliminated fron the project area. 
The benefits of the man-made recreation attractions will largely depend on the investments in 
facilities such as campsites, beaches, nature trails, etc., and the vagaries of the lake 
fishery. 
a. TERRESTRIAL ECOSYSTEM 
PROS 
1. Terrestrial habitat would be replaced 
by aquatic, seasonally-flooded areas. 
2. The delta sites, caused by sediment 
despotition at the mouths of tributaries 
to the reservoirs, may be vegetated by 
emergent wetland plants. 
b. FOREST RESOURCES 
CONS 
1. Project would inundate 88,000 plus 
acres of terrestrail habitat. 
1. A large volume of timber will be har-
vested during clearing of the impoundment 
site, so that this portion of the forest 
inventory cannot be considered as a loss. 
1. Some of the most productive forest lar. 
in the watershed occur within the ares 
are to be inundated. 
2. 88,000 acres would be flooded by the 
project. New transmission line right-
of-ways and access roads would require 
4,083 acres. 
3. 13,400 acres of forest land would exis 
as islands, being less accessible for 
harvesting. 
4. An additional 206,000 acres of forest 
land would be isolated from Maine wooc 
industry markets. 
C. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS (Continued) 
FOREST RESOURCES (Continued) 
CONS 
5. Timber harvesting operations could also be 
impacted by set-aside of additional forest 
lands for fish and wildlife mitigation. 
6. Disruption of approximately 75 miles of 
private forest access roads with resultant 
increase in timber transportation costs. 
7. 1.1% of the state's forest resource adjacent 
to the Canadian border will be isolated by 
the impoundment and made inaccessible from 
Maine. 
WILDLIFE 
PROS 
A temporary increase in seme animal 1. 
populations such as small manmals and 
deer, may occur due to the increased 
understory/browse growth following clear 
cutting and prior to flooding. 
CONS 
Conversion of approximately 88,000 acres of 
terrestrial habitat to aquatic habitat will 
result in concommitant loss of resident wild 
life, as well as reductions in wildlife 
using the site for a portion of the year 
(e.g. whitetail deer wintering areas) 
2. It is projected that one-half of the deer in 
23 townships of the St. John Region would be 
affected due to loss of wintering areas to 
the impoundment. 
3. Animal movements would be adversely affected 
by the reservoir, particularly deer which 
migrate between summer and winter ranges. 
4. Birds of prey such as osprey, hawks, and owl 
would lose preferred habitats due to 
flooding. 
5. Dickey Reservoirs would inundate 30 
identified ponds and numerous beaver ponds. 
FISHERIES 
PROS 
The U. S. Army Corps suggests an 1. 
investment of $5,000,000 to develop 
a lake trout or salmon fishery. 
CONS 
If the impoundment is built, 248 miles of 
stream fishery for brook trout will be re-
placed by a lake fishery of unknown value. 
To sustain a viable lake fishery for trout 
or salmon will require development of a 
hatchery supported by a permanent staff of 
biologists. Corps has not specified where 
and how hatchery would operate. 
C. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS (Continued) 
FISHERIES (Cont'd) 
PROS CONS 
3. Fishing could be difficult at some acres of the 
impoundment due to submerged tree stumps and 
floating debris. 
RECREATION 
Day-use activities in the area 1. 
would increase including swiniriing, 
recreational boating, family 
camping and sightseeing. 
Swimming would be limited due to the very short 
season. Boating would initially be limited due 
to floating debris. All recreational usage would 
be dependent on adequate provisions and invest-
ments in facilities. 
2. Whitewater canoeing would be eliminated in the 
project area. The project site is one of the 
few remaining wild areas in the Eastern United 
States containing a free-flowing river. 
3. Wilderness type of camping will be eliminated 
in the project area. 
4. Reduction of game populations, particularly deer, 
would result in concentration of hunters in a 
smaller area, carpeting for less game. 
5. Water level fluctuations associated with Lincoln 
School reservior would seriously alter recreation-
al use of the impoundment. 
6. A Corps of Engineers contract study by Normandeau 
Associates, Inc., found thatmercury will accumu-
late to unacceptable levels (according to EPA 
standards) in salmonoid fish in the impoundment. 
This could prohibit Maine Inland Fish & Wildlife 
fran promoting a fishery in the impoundment. 
7. The Maine Department of Environmental Protection 
does not believe water quality will be as high in 
the impoundment as the Corps of Engineers indi-
cates. Water may be brownish in color and take 
6-9 years to stabilize in quality. 
8. Lack of determination of recreation facility 
costs and commitment to facility construction 
makes determination of recreation and associated 
economic benefits uncertain. 
9. Stressed tress at the edge of the impoundment 
may be subject to disease, insect attack and 
windthrow (blow-down) discouraging recreation. 
Also discouraging recreation would be the 18,000 
acre "ring" around the lake which will likely be 
devoid of vegetation due to winter temperatures 
and ice scouring in the spring. 
C. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS (Continued) 
f. LAND USES 
PROS 
1. Extensive development of recreation 
facilities at the Dickey irrpoiindment 
could attract increased numbers of 
transient visitors to the area. 
2. The impoundment would reduce peak 
flood-flows downstream at the Fort 
Kent damage center by 50 percent. 
g. GEOLOGY AND SAFETY 
1. The current appropriation request in 
the President's budget includes funds 
to look into the geological conditions 
further. 
CONS 
1. Known sand and gravel deposits receiving 
sporadic use will be covered by the 
iirpoundment. 
2. The impoundment would cause rise of the 
local ground water table with little impac 
since residents are to be relocated. 
3. Eight archeological sites and one historic 
site which appear eligible for inclusion i 
the National Register, in addition to the 
Big Black archeological site, which is 
within the impoundment area and currently 
included on the National Register. 
4. Approximately 75 miles of existing woodu 
road network will be disrupted. 
5. Unless provisions are made, taxes accruing 
to the involved townships and the state 
would be lost, amounting to $97,000 for 
forest land and $40,000 to the Town of 
Allagash. 
1. The Maine Geological Society expressed 
serious concern regarding insufficient dat 
on the distribution of glacial sediments, 
and bedrock geology in the vicinity of the 
impoundments. This data is important in 
determining the suitability of the selecte 
sites to support the massive construction 
which can sustain earthquakes or unstable 
bedrock conditions. 
Maine is a State heavily dependent on petroleum for its energy 
requirements. This dependence is depicted in Figure 1. The goal 
of conservation must be to curb the extent to which we rely on petroleum 
products. Figures 2 and 3 depict a 1935 scenario. Figure 2 depicts a 
"business as usual" situation, and Figure 3, the situation if a vigorous 
conservation program is pursued. 
In view of the present virtual moratorium on new nuclear construction, the 
1985 figures cannot shew the badly needed swing from petroleum dependence and, 
thus, projects a situation very similar to 19 76 adjusted for annual growth. 
SOURCES OF MAINE ENERGY 
1976 1985 
"Business as 
Usual" 
1985 
Optimum 
Conservation Measures 
Conservation simply makes good economic sense. It saves our resources, 
contributes to our economic well-being, and reduces our dependence on foreign 
oil with its devastating effect on inflation and our balance of payments. 
Conservation is not necessarily doing without nor is it anti-industrial 
development: It is using energy in the most efficient possible manner. 
D. CONSERVATION (Continued) 
The following table depicts estimates by the State Office of Energy 
Resources for annual savings from the following conservation measures in Maine 
alone : 
1- Strict enforcement of the 55-mile-per-hour speed limit-
2. Reduction of speed limit on primary interstate highways to 50-miles-per-hour. 
3. Weatherization. 
4. Thermostat set back. 
PRESENT VOLUNTARY ALTERNATIVES TO DICKEY-LINCOLN 
MEASURE Barrels of Oil 
Enforcement 55MPH Speed Limit 280,400 28% 12% 
Reduce Speed to 50 MPH on 
Primary Interstate Highways 802,400 78% 35% 
We a the ri za t i on 4,600,000 498% 224% 
Thermostat Set Back to: 
65° F 
60° F 
840,000 
1,680,000 
90% 
183% 
40% 
82% 
These figures, although estimates, clearly depict the tremendous contribution of 
conservation measures, and incidentally puts in perspective the modest power contribution 
of the Dickey-Lincoln Project-
ATTACHMENT III 
DICKEY-LINCOLN PROJECT 
ENERGY DIMENSION 
IS THE PROPOSED DICKEY-LINCOIN PROJECT AN OPTIMUM USE OF THE ST. JOHN RIVER RESOURCE? 
This statement fetuses primarily on the energy dimension of the Dickey-Lincoln 
Project although carments touch economic and environmental concerns as well since they are 
inextricably woven together. The statement is brief, even though its conclusions are 
based upon a thorough study of the project and many hours spent considering the long-term 
duplications of the proposed development. 
At the outset, we should recognize that this region is heavily dependent upon 
limited supplies of foreign oil for its electric generation. New England depends upon 
imported oil for 56% of its electric generating capacity. In Maine, that figure is 
31%, soon to increase to 44% with the addition of the W.F. Wyman #4 unit at Cousins 
Island. State, Regional, and National energy policies all call for decreased dependence 
on oil through conservation and the development of alternatives with special attention 
given to renewable sources of energy. The St. John River in Maine is an important 
potential source of renewable hydroelectric energy that will almost certainly increase in 
value in the future. This River is a state asset which could be very important to m i n e ' s 
future. This is especially true for Northern and Eastern Maine which now depend upon 
uncertain and expensive Canadian power for a major part of their electrical needs. As a 
state resource, the River, if developed, ought to be developed in the best long-term 
interests of the people of Maine, with adequate sensitivity to our regional responsibilities 
There are serious questions as to whether the Dickey-Lincoln project, as it is now 
designed, is, fron an energy point of view, in the best long-term interest of this 
state. There is little question that the project is a feasible energy investment 
over the long-run considering future price increases in nonrenewable energy resources. 
It is questionable whether it is the best energy investment on the St. John River. 
All the research done on the St. John River has not yet answered the question of what 
is the best way to develop the St. John River for hydroelectric power. We are faced 
with the decision to either build or not build a particular project without full 
knowledge of the alternative hydroelectric possibilities for that River. 
The project under consideration (Dickey-Lincoln) is, from an energy point of view, 
designed primarily, although not exclusively, as a peaking power project. This 
might not be the best energy development for the St. John River. Preliminary investigations 
by the Maine Office of Energy Resources of alternatives for the St. John suggest that there 
could be base load oriented alternative hydroelectric development possibilities which 
could prove to be superior for Maine frcm the economic, environmental and energy points of 
view. A thorough study of base load hydroelectric alternatives for the St. John River shoulc 
be undertaken before we proceed with Dickey-Lincoln as it is now defined. The following 
reasons are offered for this conclusion: 
(1) Base load electric power is more important for economic development than is 
peak power. A Maine oriented base load development on the St. John would be much more 
important to Maine's long-term economic health than would Dickey-Lincoln. 
(2) It is unlikely that the State of Maine could, in the foreseeable future, have 
the need for the 900 MW peaking power to be produced at Dickey-Lincoln even if the 
preference clause issue could be somehow resolved to make more power available in Maine. 
(3) A base load oriented project may not require a new high voltage transmission 
system routed through the wilderness of Northern Maine, thereby minimizing the environmental 
impacts. 
(4) Many electric systems in New England are either in the process of implementing 
or considering implementing policies to encourage off-peak use of electricity. The 
implications of such policies cannot be predicted at this time, although they will almost 
certainly result in a diminished need for the type of high capacity peaking power to be 
produced at Dickey-Lincoln. 
(5) If sufficient nuclear or coal capacity is built in New England, then pumped 
storage could be a more econcmical source of peaking power in New England. 
(6) A Maine oriented base load project would likely require a smaller impoundment 
than would the Dickey Project. 
The Dickey-Lincoln Project, if built, will determine the use of over fifty miles of 
an important river and over 88,000 acres of forest land for over 100 years. There 
are important questions to be answered, and they should be answered even though further 
time resources might be expended. Fran Maine's energy point of view, the essential 
question has not been addressed, and that is, "What is the best hydroelectric development 
for the St. John River?" It is not suggested that a final decision should be based 
solely upon Maine's interests, but we should know the answer to this question before 
the project is built. 
ATTACHMENT IV 
DICKEY-LINCOLN PROJECT 
"PREFERENCE CLAUSE" 
I 
DICKEY-LINCOLN 
"PREFERENCE CLAUSE" 
Guidelines for marketing pcwer from federal hydroelectric projects are 
set forth in Section 5 of the Flood Control Act of ]944 (16 U.S.C. 1970 ed. 
Sec 825s) which says, among other things, that: 
.. • "Preference in the sale of such power and energy shall 
be given to public bodies and cooperatives." 
There are at present nine (9) major preference customers in Maine, and 
they purchased a combined total of 231 million kilowatt-hours in 1976. Maine's 
share of the Dickey-Lincoln output is estimated to be 533 million kilcwatt-hours. 
The Power Marketing Analysis by the U.S. Department of Interior indicates that 
preference customer load growth in Maine will be large enough to utilize Maine's 
total share of the base load energy from Dickey-Lincoln. 
It is unclear at this time what opportunities private utilities in Maine 
(who serve the vast majority of the state's electrical customers) will have to 
participate in the output from this project. Also unclear at this time is 
whether preference customers outside of Maine will receive priority distribution 
of the Dickey-Lincoln output before in-state private utilities are permitted 
to participate. 
NOTE: In 197 3, the voters of Maine overwhelmingly rejected a public power 
proposal. This project imposes the public pcwer concept without providing the 
citizens of Maine an opportunity to reverse this expression, no public 
official should circumvent the position of a majority of the people once it 
has been expressed at the ballot box. 
ATTACHMENT V 
DICKEY-LINCOLN PROJECT 
JOB IMPACTS 
JOB IMPACTS 
CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF 
DICKEY-LINCOLN 
Jobs related to Dickey-Lincoln must be broken down between those during the 
construction and those during operation of the project. Because the project creates 
an energy facility with relatively small operational requirements, the number of jobs, 
created during the operational phase will be much smaller than those created during 
construction. The two phases are therefore considered separately. 
I. Construction 
Construction of the Dickey-Lincoln Dams and associated transmission facilities 
will take approximately 8 years. During that time, the number of workers employed in 
construction will vary from year-to-year, with different skills required at different 
phases of the project. Because the work will be concentrated from the fourth through 
the seventh year of construction, the Draft Environmental Inpact Statement (DEIS) 
divides its estimates of employment into two periods: Years 1 through 3, plus Year 
8; and Years 4 through 7. 
Table 1 presents the total employment for Construction of Dickey-Lincoln and 
the Transmission Lines (All references to employment on construction of the transmission 
lines refers only to that employment building that portion of the lines in Maine. It 
excludes employment building the lines in New Hampshire and Vermont) 
TABLE I 
Years 1-3, and 8 Years 4-7 
Dickey-Lincoln 278 17C6 
Transmission Lines 483 
Total 278 2191 (See footnotes, page 5) 
Table 2 presents the DEIS estimates for the number of workers that can be 
expected to come from the Aroostook County area, the rest of Maine, and outside of 
Maine. 
TABLE II 
Aroostook County Rest of Maine Total Maine Out of State 
Years 1-3, 8 
Years 4 - 7 * 
61 
374** 
81 
501** 
142 
1141* 
136 
1050* 
Percent of Total 22% 29% 52% 
* Includes Transmission Lines 
** Because the employment data in the DEIS on the transmission lines does not 
distinguish between Aroostook County and the rest of Maine as the Dickey-
Lincoln DEIS does, these figures are for the Dickey-Lincoln dams only. 
It should be noted that the methodology used to estimate the number of jobs 
which will go to Maine and Aroostook County residents may overstate the number of 
jobs in these categories, especially in the case of Aroostook County. The DEIS 
based these estimates on the availability of skills in the various categories required 
by Dickey-Lincoln in Aroostook County and Maine, and assumed that where there was 
unemployment in a skill, those unemployed in the local area would be hired first. For 
example, if carpenters were needed, those unemployed carpenters looking for work in 
Aroostook County would be hired first, then carpenters fron outside of Aroostook 
County- There is a further assumption that the reminder o£ carpenters would ccme 
from Maine. 
This method probably overstates the situation with regard to local hires because 
there is no guarantee that jobs will go to unemployed individuals. Those currently 
employed at the time of the project may seek to work there because of the relatively 
high wage rates (See below) Thus, those who find work at Dickey-Lincoln will be 
first-care, first-hired based, of course, on experience. There would be no way to 
assure that Aroostook County, or even Maine residents in general, will be hired 
in the proportions indicated. However, the DEIS projections on hiring Maine 
residents may be "in the ballpark" since the remoteness of the Dickey-Lincoln site 
will not encourage many out-of-state residents to cone seeking employment there. 
Thus, this paper will continue to use an approximate figure of 52% hired frcm Maine. 
Despite the uncertainty which surrounds these figures in Table II, it can be said 
with seme confidence that the Aroostook County area will contribute primarily laborers 
to the project, with a variety of skilled workers (carpenters, electricians, painters, 
plumbers, millwrights, iron workers, etc.) ccming frcm Aroostook County or the rest 
of Maine. Operating Engineers and Teamsters are the largest skilled categories 
requiring out-of-state workers. 
Table III presents the estimated total wage and salary income which can be expected 
frcm the project. In this table, net income is defined as gross income less 30% 
for state and federal taxes, and personal benefit contributions. 
TABLE III 
Net Inccme to 
Gross Inccme Net Income Maine Workers 
Net Inccme to Out 
of State Workers 
Dickey-Lincoln 99,450,000 69,150,000 35,503,650 33,646,350 
Transmission Lines 8,000,000 5,610,000 3,100,000 2,500,000 
Total 107,450,000 74,769,000 38,136,500 35,963,500 
Table IV presents annual averages and totals of net wage and salary income 
for the two major periods of construction. 
TABLE IV 
Years 1-3,8 Years 4-7* 
Total Maine Total Maine 
Total 
for Period $11,306,025 $5,766,073 $62,536,740 $32,519,105 
Annual Avg. $ 2,826,506 $ 1,441,518 $15,634,185 $ 8,129,776 
Includes Transmission Line Construction 
These income estimates are based on wage rates which must, by federal law, 
be no less than other federal wages in the area for skill categories required. 
This means that the average hourly wage across all skill categories for Dickey-
Lincoln will be approximately $8.00. This is roughly 130% higher than the current 
wage levels in these categories in Aroostook County. The unskilled hourly wage 
rate will probably be around $5.00 an hour, almost triple the current wage rate on 
farming in the area. These wage rates will certainly attract job seekers from a 
much wider area than Aroostook County. 
The effect on unemployment in the Fort Kent-Allagash region is likely to be 
minimal. If all the currently unemployed people in the Fort Kent area in the 
various skill categories required by Dickey-Lincoln were hired for the project, the 
unemployment rate in the area would drop approximately 25%, from 9% to 7%. However, 
as indicated above, this is not likely to be the case. 
In fact, the history of major projects in remote areas such as Dickey-Lincoln 
has shown that unemployment rates in the local area actually tend to rise during 
construction. This is due to the large number of workers who come to the area 
seeking employment but not finding it, or finding it only for relatively short 
periods but remaining on the chance of working again. There may also be high 
seasonal unemployment in the area, since most of the work must be done during the 
summer. Overall, therefore, there is not likely to be any significant betterment of 
the unemployment rate frcm construction of Dickey-Lincoln. 
Secondary employment frcm construction of Dickey-Lincoln is difficult to 
estimate. The DEIS makes a projection of 500-600 in Aroostook County, using a 
multiplier of 1.55. However, the DEIS is based on the erroneous assumption that 
remote areas have higher multipliers. In fact, the opposite is true. Because remote 
areas have relatively fewer goods and services to offer, money earned in construction job 
will probably be saved and then taken out of the area when the worker leaves. There will 
certainly be secondary employment in the area created by Dickey-Lincoln, but it is likely 
to be much less than the 500-600 jobs projected in the DEIS. 
There are likely to be several negative effects in Aroostook County as a result 
of Dickey-Lincoln. The most significant of these negative effects will probably be 
the inflation in wage rates brought about by the legally-required high wage rates at 
the project. The effect will be most severe on the availability of agricultural workers 
in Aroostook County, although it may not be a direct effect of Dickey-Lincoln jobs. 
That is, some farm laborers will seek jobs working on Dickey-Lincoln, but only a few 
will be hired relative to the total number of farm workers. However, as Dickey-
Lincoln pulls other non-skilled workers frcm Aroostook County because of its high 
wage rates, farm workers may seek other non-skilled jobs thus left vacant. The 
higher wage rates of Dickey—Lincoln may thus drive the price of non—skilled labor to 
the point where seme small farmers cannot afford the price of labor and will be 
driven out of business. It is not clear, however, hew many farmers would be affected. 
Other employers of non-skilled, and skilled workers in Aroostook County will also 
see their labor prices rising, with a resulting spread of general inflation throughout 
the labor market. This may also affect small contractors and other firms adversely, 
though again it is difficult to estimate the exact number. 
It should also be noted that there will be a large influx of dollars into the area 
economy frcm the wages and salaries and from any locally-purchased supplies. This 
will lead to an inflationary situation in the local economy which will degrade the 
real inccmes of existing residents, and may induce a local wage-price spiral for the 
four years of peak activity at the dams. 
II. Operation 
Job impacts during the Operation phase will be derived fron three primary sources: 
(1) Jobs operating and maintaining the dams and power facilities. The DEIS 
estimates that there would be 68 such jobs, 60 of which would be filled from area 
residents. This is, of course, a relatively small addition to the area work force, 
and would not generate significant secondary employment opportunities. 
(2) Jobs created as a result of economic development engendered by the 
electricity made available by the power generating facilities. 
The creation of such jobs is highly speculative. It would depend on the 
extent of utilization of Dickey-Lincoln
1
 s intermediate power for industrial use. 
This is impossible to predict at this time. It is conceivable that the 
electric systems in the state could make full use of the intermediate power to 
be generated, leaving none left over for econcmic development, but it is probable 
that at least seme power would be available for development. 
(3) The jobs lost in the forest harvesting industry from the flooding of the 
impoundment area. 
Again, it is very difficult to predict how many jobs would be lost from the 
impoundment area flooding. A Department of Conservation report estimated that there 
would be a loss of $990,617,000 in value added frcm the lost forest resources, part 
of this value added is wages and salaries, although it is not possible to make on 
exact determination of wages and salaries lost from this figure. 
However, it is likely that at most, if not all, those who would be 
employed cutting in the impoundment area would find employment in other areas of the 
woods; this is especially likely if more intensive use of the forest resources is 
made over the remainder of the century. 
Footnotes 
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Draft Environmental Impact Statement 
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Transmission Project 
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ATTACHMENT VI 
DICKEY-LINCOLN PROJECT 
POTENTIAL CANADIAN POWER PURCHASES 
POTENTIAL CANADIAN POWER PURCHASES IN RELATION TO DICKEY -LINCOLN 
The Canadians have indicated an interest in selling electric power to the United 
States. 
CLASSES OF TRANSACTIONS 
There are three classes of transactions for electric power potentially available 
at this time. 
I. Firm Capacity Power 
New Brunswick is now constructing a nuclear plant at Point LePreau on the 
Atlantic Coast. They have indicated an interest in negotiating for 150 
MW of base load power. This could possibly be purchased by a Maine utility 
for a fixed period of time, perhaps 15-20 years. Maine utilities through 
NEPOOL may be considering such purchases. It is Canadian Government policy 
to limit the duration of such contracts so that the power could be available 
later as Canadian needs grow to meet their expanded capacity. Such contracts 
allow the Canadians to take advantage of the economies of scale of large 
plants without forever giving up ownership and use of these larger plants. 
The Canadians have also indicated a willingness to sell electric capacity 
from the following very large facilities: 
Churchill Falls, Labrador 
5225 MW, in service since 197*4. Most of output from Labrador to Quebec, 
a provincial transfer, a small fraction staying in Labrador. Quebec 
then transfers some power to New York (PASNY). 
James Bay, Quebec 
10,000+ M W , $15.2 billion cost. This project has been under construction 
since 1974, and is due for completion in stages between. 1980 and 1985. 
Gull Island, Labrador 
1800 MW nominal capacity, $2.9 billion construction cost, half of which 
is for "the transmission lines to Newfoundland. Generating station cost 
about $1.5 billion. Part of the output is for Newfoundland, the balance 
will go to Quebec. A private corporation, the Lower Churchill Development 
Corporation, will be set up later this year and they will be responsible 
for marketing the power from Gull Island. 
II. Seasonal Diversity Transfers 
Seasonal Diversity Transfers are transfers of pcwer between areas that experience 
different seasonal peaks. For example, Quebec is a winter peaking system and 
is currently selling capacity to New York during the summer-since New York 
is a summer peaking system. New England, on the other hand, is a winter peaking 
system at this time. Therefore, this seasonal diversity power does not appear 
to be particularly useful to New England. 
Hcwever, it is possible that summer peaking might be worth looking into from 
Maine's point of view in the long run. Summer's experience with low head hydro 
indicates that production can be significantly affected during dry summer periods. 
If Maine could purchase power from Canada during the summer, this might make low 
head hydro development more attractive to Maine. This is a possibility that we 
shall continue to pursue in our assessment of low head hydro potential. Pre-
liminary discussions with Hydro Quebec indicate that a significant amount of 
summer capacity could be available. However, this class of power is not a 
specific alternative to Dickey-Lincoln. 
III. Economy Energy 
Quebec is largely dependent on hydro for its electric generation. The amount 
of hydroelectric energy they generate varies throughout the year depending 
upon water availability. They are interested in selling surplus energy from 
their system "when it happens to be available." This type of "incidental" 
energy cannot be depended upon to -supply new capacity needs. 
However, this type of energy is worth looking into further, as it is sold at 
discount prices and can be used to save oil and cut back on production at more 
expensive plants. This type of transaction is worth purchasing with the 
objective of possibly decreasing the price of electricity, but not as a source 
of new generation capacity such as Dickey-Lincoln. 
COMPARATIVE ECONOMICS 
It should be noted that we do not know what the specific economics of these suggested 
transactions would be at this time, and there are questions with regard to the long 
term availability of such power. Some of the uncertainty regarding Canadian purchases 
stems from the fact that contracts are controlled by both the Federal and Provincial 
Governments. 
The Canadian Government, through the National Energy Board, regulates the exportation 
of electricity from Canada. The National Energy Board, in considering an application 
to export power, must satisfy itself that the quantity of energy to be exported is 
surplus over reasonably foreseeable Canadian requirements, and that the price to be 
charged is reasonable in relation to the public interest. In addition, the Board 
is required to consider all matters that appear to be relevant, giving them a fairly 
broad mandate. 
To ensure that an export price is just and reasonable, the Board has developed three 
criteria that the price mist meet. Firstly, it must cover fully the cost of energy 
to be exported. Secondly, it must not be less than the price to Canadians for 
comparable service. Thirdly, it should not be markedly less than the least-cost 
alternative available to the foreign purchaser. 
TRANSMISSION 
The only direct connection fcJr Maine to the Canadian System is one line through New 
Brunswick. This line has the capacity to accommodate the 150 MW of the Point LePreau 
plant if some Maine utility does decide to purchase that capacity. Further increases 
in power exchange could well mean new transmission systems. This whole question of 
transmission needs to be looked into further at the point at which we might begin 
rare specific planning in terms of the importation of power from Canada. It is 
possible that the Dickey-Lincoln project could in fact facilitate the purchase of 
Canadian Power by virtue of the transmission system which would be underutilized 
during off peak hours. 
VERMONT TRANSACTIONS 
Vermont is negotiating with Quebec a short term arrangement to fill gaps for the ne>^: 
few years, and a longer term agreement to transmit power to NEPOOL for New England 
consumption. Hcwever, no agreement has -been signed between Vermont and Quebec. 
SUMMARY 
There is a possibility of purchasing nuclear power from Point LePreau. This could 
be similar to Maine's share of Dickey-Lincoln power. However, we would not be able 
to undertake a comparison of the economics until the completion of negotiations for 
the pcwer. 
It is also worth noting that a Point LePreau purchase might be advisable for 
Maine even if base load power were available from Dickey-Lincoln for Maine. 
ATTACHMENT VII 
DICKEY-LINCOLN PROJECT 
SMALL HYDRO ALTERNATIVES 
SMALL HYDRO ALTERNATIVES 
We have completed the first phase of an inventory of existing dams in Maine 
and have indentified about 2,000 dams. Data relating to these dams has been 
submitted to the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers for analysis as part of the New 
England River Basins Commission Hydro Power Study. Preliminary results to date, 
fron this first phase inventory are very encouraging and indicate a substantial 
availability in terms of numbers and dispersal of sites, potential capacity, and 
energy production. 
This inventory is the first step in assessing the hydro power potential of 
Maine's existing dams. We will new proceed to phase two with successive stages 
of screening and evaluation of the identified sites. 
Results of the ccmputer analysis of inventory data of 546 dams initially 
analyzed indicate that 229 of the undeveloped (non-generating) dams or about 
42% of the total have a potential for 50 KW or more of generating capacity and 
need further evaluation. 
The average capability of these dams is falling in the one-three megawatt 
range. These numbers are very preliminary, but give SOXVB indication of the 
magnitude of the resource that we are pursuing. 
In the final analysis, the amount of hydro power brought on-line in Maine 
will be influenced by economics, institutional restraints, recreational concerns, 
and the ever-increasing magnitude of environmental impacts. 
ATTACHMENT VIII 
t 
DICKEY-LINCOLN PROJECT 
BENEFIT-COST SUMMARY 
Dickey-Lincoln School Lakes Benefit-Cost Summary 
( Hydroelectric Project, St. John River, Maine, U.S. Array Corps of Engineers 
(March 1977 Price Levels) 
DAMS 
Total Investment 
Construction Cost of Dams 
Interest During Construction 
Present worth of future recreation 
facilities 
Total 
Capital Recovery Factory (Dams) 
Annual Costs 
Interest and Amortization 
Operation and Maintenance 
Pumping Power (43S,000,000 kwh x $.010) 
Major Replacements 
Loss of Land Taxes 
Lost recreational opportunities 
Subtotal Dans 
3-1/4% 
$544,000,000 
56,600,000 
236,000 
$600,836,000 
.03383 
20,356,000 
2,100,000 
4,380,000 
315,000 
142,000 
193,000 
6-3/8% 
$544,000,000 
111,000,000 
170,000 
$655,170,000 
.06388 
41,852,000 
2,100,000 
4,380,000 
166,000 
142,000 
136,000 
8-1/2%* 
$544,000,000 
143,110,000 
136,313 
$692,246,000 
.08502 
58,859,477 
2,100,000 
4,380,000 
101,000 
142,000 
122,000** 
$ 27,486,000 $ 48,776,000 $ 65,704,000 
.RANSMISSION LIKES 
Total Investment 
Construction Costs of Transmission Line 
Interest During Construction 
Total 
Annual Costs 
Interest and Amortization 
Operation and Maintenance 
Reduction - future wheeling by others; 
Granite—Essex 
Subtotal Transmission 
$146,300,000 
10,410,000 
6,950,000 
3,650,000 
-390,000 
$146,300,000 
20,920,000 
$146,300,000 
28,400,000 
$156,710,000 $167,220,000 $174,700,000 
$ 11,610,000 
3,650,000 
-450,000 
$ 14,854,179 
3,650,000 
-4 76.000 
$ 10,210,000 $ 14,810,000 $ 18,028,000 
TOTAL PROJECT 
Total Investment 
Cons truction 
Interest During Construction 
Present Worth - future recreation 
Total 
$690,300,000 
67,010^000 
236_j 000 
$690,300,000 
131,920,000 
170,000 
$690,300,000 
176,510,000 
136,000 
$757,546,000 $822,390,000 $866,946,000 
^ourcc: Table 1.07, "Economic Data," Dickey-Lincoln School Lakes Environmental 
Impact Statement (U'althaa, MA: Corps of Engineers, August, 1977), pp. 1-23, L . 
•Computed following Army Corps procedures by Lawrence G. Hines, Economics Department, 
Dartmouth Col logo, ll.inover, N.U. 03755. 
**Includcs cstim.uo of $1'»,500 Tor loss during construction. 
Dickey-Lincoln School Lakes Benefit-Cost Summary 
(Continued) 
Annual Costs $ 
3-1/4% 
37,696,000 $ 
6-3/8% 
63,586,000 $ 
8-1/2% 
83,732,000 
Annual Benefits 
Peaking Power (15.4% Capicity Factor) 
874,000 kw x .904 x $30.00 
1,182,600,000 kwh x .914 x $.034 
$ 23,703,000 
36,750,000 
$ 23,703,000 
36,750,000 
$ 23,703,000 
36,750,000 
Intermediate Power (42.9% Capacity Factor) 
70,000 kw x .980 x $68.50 
262,800,000 kwh x .989 x $.026 
4,699,000 
6,758,000 
4,699,000 
6,758,000 
4,699,000 
6,758,000 
Downstream 
350,000,000 kwh x $.010 3,500,000 3,500,000 3,500,000 
Subtotal Power $ 75,410,000 $ 75,410,000 $ 75,410,000 
Recreation 172,000 145,000 133,000 
Redevelopment 1,691,000 2,689,000 3,198,000 
Prevention of Flood Damages 696,000 686,000 686,000 
TOTAL ANNUAL BENEFITS $ 77,969,000 $ 78,930,000 $ 79,427,000 
TOTAL ANNUAL COSTS $ 37,696,000 $ 63,586,000 $ 83^732,000 
BENEFIT-COST RATIO 2.1 to 1 1.2 to 1 0.95 to 1 ' 
1. Cost of pumpback energy is included in project Annual Operation and 
Maintenance Costs. 
2. The .904 and .914 etc. factors noted in power benefit analysis reflect 
estimated reduction in capacity and energy outputs due to transmission 
line losses. 
*The 6-3/8 entry for ''prevention of flood damages
1 1
 has been used instead 
of refiguring at 8-1/22 because the change is insignificant. 
Dickey-Lincoln School Lakes Benefit-Cost: Summary 
(Continued) 
At 8*5%, the Dickey-Lincoln project costs more than it returns in 
benefits. That is, a ratio of 0.95 to 1 means that Dickey-Lincoln 
produces only 95 cents value for every dollar expended. (The 8%% rate 
was chosen because it is approximately the market prime interest rate 
in raid 1978.) Moreover, if such questionable project credits as 
redevelopment and downstream benefits are disallowed, the benefit-cost 
ratio is 0.87 to 1. Finally, if taxes are acknowledged as a cost by 
adopting the 5.1% adjustment used by the Federal Power Commission in 
its studies, the benefit-cost ratio for the Dickey-Lincoln project 
drops to 0.67 to 1. 
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